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COMMENTARY




We all know that there are ten commandments. As your Law Review
banquet speaker, much in your debt for a day of courtesy and conviviality,
it would be unkind of me to test you on your knowledge of those command-
ments. Instead, in return for your many kindnesses and the hospitality of
your Dean, my long-time friend Ivan Bodensteiner, I want to advance your
knowledge and explore an Eleventh Commandment. Because I want to en-
courage your interest in public service by commending to you the avenue of
public interest litigation,' I will particularly examine the implications of
this Eleventh Commandment, to be found in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,2 on the prospects and values of that important area of
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. This article is derived from a speech
given by Professor LaFrance at the Valparaiso University School of Law, in May, 1987. The
original text has been augmented, and footnotes added. The colloquial tone of the speech has
been preserved.
1. The author has, for over fifteen years, trained legal services attorneys in federal litiga-
tion for the poor. Such litigation seeks to enforce public law entitlements, either under the
Constitution or federal statutes, in such diverse contexts as welfare, housing, education, em-
ployment discrimination, prisoner's rights, and First Amendment interests. It is therefore re-
ferred to as public interest litigation. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). Two surveys of the subject by the author may be found in
LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, 1972 LAW & Soc. ORD. 1, [hereinafter, LaFrance,
Federal Litigation], and LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487.
2. Rule II requires that:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the
party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
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litigation.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been around a
long time. In rough terms, it imposed a subjective test of good faith on
lawyers, requiring that they file pleadings only when, in good faith, they
believed that the pleadings served a valid purpose within the litigation.' Not
surprisingly, all lawyers, at all times, hold such belief. Hence, Rule 11 was
rarely invoked and operated, if at all, only as a kind of gentle reminder that
we should all go forth and do good. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
felt more was needed to curb unspecified "abuses.""
In 1983, the Rule was amended. There was to be a threefold focus:
prior inquiry was required to assure that pleadings were "well grounded in
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Rule II has become a growth industry for academic commentators. Among the recent
pieces before and - primarily -after the speech which led to this Article are Cavanagh,
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1986); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule I1 - Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.
REV. 1313 (1986); Note, Litigant Responsibility: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II And Its
Application, 27 B.C.L. REV. 385 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Litigant Responsibility]; Note,
Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule II Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1987) [hereinafter Note, Plausible Pleadings]; Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot
Later: Constraining Frivolty in Litigation Under Rule 11 , 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1267 (1986)
[hereinafter Comment, Ask Questions]; Comment, The Dynamics of Rule ]I: Preventing
Frivolous Litigation By Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300
(1986) [hereinafter Comment, The Dynamics of Rule 11]; Note, The 1983 Amendments to
Rule 11: Answering the Critics' Concern with Judicial Self-Restraint, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 798 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The 1983 Amendments].
3. A general review of the development and scope of Rule I 1 and the 1983 amendments
may be found in 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice § 11.01 (2d
ed. 1987) [hereinafter Moore's Federal Practice]; 5 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed-
eral Practice & Procedure, §§ 1331-1335 (Supp. 1987).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
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fact," advanced a tenable legal theory, and were "not interposed for any
improper purpose." Previously, the Rule had looked only at subjective in-
tent and willful misconduct. The amendments substituted a reasonable at-
torney, "objective" test to determine whether pleadings were appropriately
filed.' On the surface, these changes may seem only minor tinkering.
These changes have a major impact, however, on public interest litiga-
tion. This form of litigation advances interests assured by innovative and
oftentimes controversial legislation which creates rights or entitlements in
social programs such as welfare, education, healthcare, and the like. Such
litigation is often constitutionally grounded and brought on behalf of pris-
oners, welfare recipients, racial minorities, and other representatives of the
powerless and the unpopular in our society. It is all very new, and much of
it is very, very controversial.6
Rule 11 is antithetical to public interest litigation. The principles ad-
vanced by public interest litigation invite lawyers to right wrongs and
change the world. Rule 11, to oversimplify, commands that we do so as
reasonable people, without disturbing the status quo ante. The difference in
perspectives could hardly be clearer. There is no "norm" for public interest.
litigation since much of it is brought to challenge and change existing
5. Prior to 1983, Rule II read as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit, The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must
be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborat-
ing circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not
been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropri-
ate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. II (amended 1983). See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, at §
11.02[31, as to the principle effects of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11:
The primary effect of the 1983 amendment was the elimination of Rule I l's 'good faith'
defense and the creation of a 'reasonable inquiry' duty. Because the old Rule disciplined
only wilful violators who knew their pleadings were without good ground to support them,
'unless the pleading was preposterous on its face, the less the pleader inquired, the safer
he was from sanction.' The current Rule requires legal and factual inquiry by the signer
of a pleading, motion or other paper, and it places the signer at risk if the inquiry proves
not to have been 'reasonable.' In determining what is reasonable, the standard generally
applied is that of a competent attorney.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes ommitted). For the full text of Rule I1, as amended, see
supra note 2.
6. See generally Chayes, supra note I; Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2.
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norms of community behavior and create new norms in their stead.
Public interest litigation is largely brought by lawyers from the ACLU,
National Lawyers Guild, NAACP, Sierra Club, and federally-funded legal
services programs. Such suits are often defended by government or corpo-
rate attorneys. Rule 11, then, is a conservative check, pitting conservative
and liberal factions of the bar against each other. It also embodies a strug-
gle between our judicial system, that most conservative of forces, and Con-
gress, which has adopted public interest legislation that is to be enforced by
public interest litigation. So the conflict created in 1983 by Rule 11 impli-
cates values fundamental to our system of constitutional government. It also
represents a collision between the democraticizing values of federal reform
of the 1930s, which led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
efforts during the 1980s, to close the federal courts to the poor and the
powerless.
This article will discuss why Rule 11 has come about and why we
should see it for what it is: a swing of the pendulum away from fifty years
of progress in individual rights and civil liberties. The swing has been pow-
erful and its sweep has been broad. In four years of existence, the 1983
amendments to Rule 11 have generated literally hundreds of opinions; prior
to 1983, there were only a few dozen.7 These cases are not randomly dis-
tributed - they are disproportionately concentrated in areas of interest to
public interest lawyers. 8 It is not insignificant that during roughly the same
time, the Reagan Administration has appointed nearly 50% of the present
federal judiciary. Rule 11, then, is only one small part of a political agenda
imposing an ambitious, conservative philosophy on the federal courts.9
At issue is not only public interest litigation, but the public interest
itself.
7. Under old Rule 11, there were at most only a few dozen instances when sanctions
were requested or imposed from 1938 to 1983. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforce-
ment: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV.
1, 34 (1976). See also Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 504-06 and accompanying notes; Nelken,
supra note 2, at 1314 n.5 (citing Risinger, supra). In the first two years after adoption, there
were 200 reported cases under Rule 11. Nelken analyzes these in considerable detail finding
that most were concentrated in a few urban centers. Id. at 1325-29.
8. A useful survey of cases, by circuit and result, is found in the appendices to Nelken's
article. Nelken, supra note 2, at 1354-69.
9. President Reagan has, for two decades, been hostile to public interest litigation. As
Governor of California, he vetoed federal funding for California Rural Legal Assistance, a
statewide legal aid program. His judicial appointments, he has openly declared, have been
selected to be consistent with his conservative views. The tenor and quality of his views have
all been recently affirmed by the Bork-Ginsburg-Kennedy saga which unfolded during the
summer of 1987, after this speech was delivered but before this Article was finished.
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II. A FEW WORDS ABOUT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
A. In the Beginning...
In the beginning, litigation was not brought to enforce the public inter-
est. Indeed, most litigation remains as it was two or three hundred years
ago, dedicated to advancing private interest, usually in property or contract
or tort.10 The public is interested enough to create a cause of action on my
behalf, and it will provide a neutral forum in the form of a court; but soci-
ety will not encourage me to sue you." Moreover, the recent emphasis on
alternative dispute resolution indicates that the public is most interested
now, in the 1980s, in having me not use that forum, but is interested in
having me settle my claim by some other means."2
All of this is consistent with what for centuries was an abhorrence of
litigation. It truly is the American view that litigation is to be avoided
above all things except perhaps death and pestilence. In small towns in
America, litigious people are still avoided, and making a "fuss" or "federal
case" over something remains a sure way of making yourself a social pa-
riah. Getting along is the better way, socially and legally.
But there have been three constitutional revolutions in America, one in
the 1700s, one in the 1800s, and a third in our century. Each has some
bearing on the public interest in litigation. I will trust that you know about
the Revolution in 1776. It led to the Bill of Rights.
We called the revolution in the 1800s a Civil War. It led to the Civil
Rights Acts of the 1870s, which created causes of action on behalf of those
who were denied federal rights under color of state law.' 3 These statutes
were intended to ensure that the newly freed slaves and the federal agents
who went into the South on their behalf were all treated fairly.' They were
not to be jailed or dispossessed or otherwise denied rights under color of
state law. Those statutes lay virtually unused for 100 years."
The catalyst which awoke those slumbering provisions was the Ameri-
can Revolution of our own century, the New Deal. After the Great Depres-
sion, our concept of our national obligation toward the unemployed, the
10. See generally Chayes, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION - A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1982).
14. See generally LaFrance, Federal Litigation, supra note I.
15. Id. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), read the Reconstruction Civil Rights
Acts very restrictively. Not until the desegregation cases, Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), were they fully exercised. Even then, the focus remained on the facial prac-
tices which prompted the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments.
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elderly, the deprived, and the disadvantaged changed radically. For the first
time, Congress declared, through the Social Security Act, that this nation
would not leave the poor to starve, the elderly to waste away, the unem-
ployed to beg, or the children of America to grow up in poverty. 6 In Ed-
wards v. California,17 the Supreme Court affirmed that this is one nation
and that we cannot turn our backs upon our poor or disadvantaged. By the
end of the Second World War, this awakening was completed by the return
of veterans who had fought a terrible war to advance national ideals of a
nation committed to social justice. They insisted that those ideals be a
reality.
B. Coming Up to Date
All of this underlay what is both the fountainhead and the model of
public interest litigation, the lawsuit which became known as Brown v.
Board of Education. 8 That case is best known for having declared an end
to segregation in schools. The lawsuit was hardly a fender bender or a col-
lections case. It is the classic model of public litigation: no private injury
was asserted, no dollars in redress were sought, no individual person was
prosecuted as a wrongdoer, and no past focus limited the remedy or the role
of the Court. Instead, Brown v. Board of Education fulfilled all of the crite-
ria Professor Chayes has identified in his superb article, The Role of the
Judge in Public Interest Litigation:'9 relief was uniquely injunctive, the role
of the judge was ongoing and forward-looking, court authority was manage-
rial, and relief was sought under constitutional principles, pursuant to pub-
lic interest statutes, for a broad class of people, numbering in the
thousands, perhaps millions. Perhaps most importantly, the issues were
grounded on unclear, yet fundamental concepts which challenged decades
of custom entrenched in legal protections.
The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts made Brown possible. They cre-
ated a cause of action on behalf of anyone who was denied federal rights
under color of state law. 0 After Brown came a far less famous but equally
important case: Monroe v. Pape." In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police of-
16. With apologies to others, but for ease of convenience, the author at this point in the
speech and article, is citing to his own works whenever possible. See generally A. LAFRANCE,
WELFARE LAW: STRUCTURE AND ENTITLEMENT (1979).
17. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Chayes, supra note 1.
20. Absent such a statute, a constitutional claim must rest directly on the underlying
constitutional provision, and the courts must then create a remedy, something they are reluc-
tant to do. But see Bivens v. Six Unknown, Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (permitting
such a suit against federal agents for violations of the Fourth Amendment).
21. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
[Vol. 22
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ficers invaded Willie Monroe's home one night, strip-searched him, took
him downtown, held him until morning, and then kicked him out onto the
streets. When he complained that he wanted justice, they replied that this
was justice, Chicago-style. Monroe decided he wanted constitutional justice
and made a federal case out of it under the Reconstruction statutes.
The Chicago police and the City of Chicago were astonished. The po-
lice had not intended to deprive Monroe of "rights," just a little dignity and
privacy. If he wanted to sue in tort, the state courts were available, and he
should exhaust those remedies. Moreover, if, as Monroe said, the police
were acting illegally, then they could hardly be said to be acting under
"color of state law." Think about it. There were other arguments of that
quality, all of which the United States Supreme Court rejected." The
Court affirmed the policy of the Reconstruction: to place the federal judici-
ary squarely in the path of state injustice and on the side of citizens seeking
to correct such injustice in the public interest.
At about the same time, Congress was taking important steps. It was
considering civil rights legislation and social programs which were as pro-
foundly important as the Social Security Act had been. Well into the
1980s, Congress was correcting the imbalance of social justice in favor of
blacks, hispanics, women, the handicapped, children requiring special edu-
cation, and other underprivileged groups. Congress mandated fair and equal
treatment in such areas as education, employment, housing, and public ac-
commodations. 3 Along with this, came important new social legislation
which created programs in healthcare, welfare, education, and the
environment.
Public interest litigation was either expressly or impliedly to be the
vehicle for individuals to enforce these new rights. Governmental agency
22. The Court held that the City of Chicago was immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976), a holding later overruled in Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
23. It would hardly make sense here to string dozens of citations to document the pro-
position in the text, which the author assumes is common ground and common knowledge.
What is astonishing, however, is that a mere twenty-five years ago, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6
(1982)), was not yet law. We had not yet committed ourselves to ending discrimination in
employment, public accommodations, and voting. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2000e-17 (1982)), directed at discrimination in employment, and the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985)), aimed at assisting the handicapped to get
a free and appropriate education, were not yet law. The many state public accommodations
statutes of the 1970s are only ten or fifteen years old. The explosion in creating and protecting
individual rights has been phenomenal and reflects a fundamental shift in this nation's com-
mitment to individual rights.
1988]
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enforcement was not enough.24 Individuals were to have an individual right
to enforcement. The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts became a vehicle for
enforcing these new entitlements and interests. Where Congress had not
expressly created a right to sue, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 guaranteed federal
rights, constitutional or statutory, against private or public infringement
under color of state law.2" This included the new federal social programs.2 6
In 1966, when I first looked at section 1983 and brought my first action in
federal court, the annotations in U.S.C.A. were only ten pages long.
The last time I looked, they filled an entire volume.
C. Has This Been a Good Thing?
I view this as progress. Perhaps only a law school Dean or an old 1960s
litigator could find comfort and progress in a floodtide of litigation. But I
can attest, and others can attest along with me, that America is a vastly
better place then it was in the mid-1960s. Our prisons are better, our police
are better, our schools and our mental hospitals are better. To a considera-
ble extent, we can attribute this to the vision of legislators in Washington
and in our state capitols. But we should also attribute this, and do so
frankly, to the courage of individual citizens - and their attorneys - who
challenged injustice in the public interest.
The best recognition of this view has come from the Congress of the
United States. In 1976, the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, Congress passed what is one of the most important laws in the
history of civil rights legislation,27 the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976.28 It is no mistake that this enactment appears as an amend-
24. Governmental enforcement through the EEOC or other agencies is useful but also
has its limits and is particularly susceptible to political considerations. Hence, Congress has
frequently created individual entitlements to sue. An example of this dual approach exists in
employment discrimination under Title VII. Other examples abound. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1973).
25. These statutes create causes of action against those denying rights under "the Con-
stitution and laws" of the United States. The "and laws" language incorporates statutory enti-
tlements, such as welfare benefits. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
26. In addition, federal courts have often "implied" a direct, independent right to sue
under federal program statutes, and have found congressional intent to be advanced thereby.
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The criteria for finding such implied intent are a matter
of much dispute within the present Supreme Court, since not finding such intent restricts liti-
gation. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987).
27. 1 would view the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts as the most important and the
Administrative Procedure Act, particularly the portions creating judicial review, 5 U.S.C. §
701-706 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985), a close second; the two together create a scheme of govern-
mental accountability to individual citizens.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
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ment to the crucial Reconstruction enactments of 100 years earlier. The
1976 Act says that a prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees from
the other side in a suit brought under civil rights statutes or other federal
legislation.2 9 You can now do well for yourself by doing good for others.
Perhaps this is not testimony to the idealism and social conscience of
public interest lawyers. I think it is. But for those who feel that the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act is only testimony to lawyers' mendacity,
I will respond by saying that fees are no less important to lawyers who
represent the poor than to those who represent the wealthy. Attorney's fees
awards are the catalyst for vindicating the interests of the poor, the handi-
capped, the disadvantaged, and a huge multitude of others who seek a more
just society."s These groups are now helped in their quest by the prospect of
attorneys being available through payment by the wrongdoer at the same
rates which make the best attorneys available to the most powerful
corporations.
In short, Congress has been a liberalizing force under our Constitution,
extending the reach of social legislation and of the federal courts. Congress'
consistent policy has been to open access to those courts and to do so in the
public interest.3 "
III. AND Now, A FEW WORDS ABOUT RULE 11 ..
A. Reading, 'Riting, and 'Rithmetic
The impact of Rule 11 on all of this is perhaps not self-evident. All the
Rule seems to do is require that lawyers read their pleadings before signing
them, file those pleadings only after making good faith factual inquiry, and
check the pleadings against the tote board of tenable legal theory. Reading,
writing, and arithmetic are what we expect of elementary school children.
Shouldn't we expect them as well of lawyers?
29. The Act was a direct response to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the "Ameri-
can Rule" that litigants bear their own expenses in the absence of bad faith or the creation of
a common fund. See Aleyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). By
that decision, the Supreme Court rejected a decade of liberal development of awarding attor-
ney's fees where litigants, in the public interest, had acted as private attorneys general. This
tension between Congress and the Court will be developed further infra and is central to an
understanding of Rule 11.
30. Multiple citations seem unnecessary, but some of the flavor of the importance and
the impact of attorney's fees awards may be found in Justice Powell's dissent, and the Appen-
dix thereto, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I, 11-37 (1980).
31. It it worth noting that the 1976 Attorney's Fees Act also removed the $ 10,000 juris-
dictional requirement in federal question cases. This had been a major barrier in public inter-
est cases to access to federal courts. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat.
2721 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
19881
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The answer, which will not create surprise, is both yes and no. Yes, we
should expect lawyers to be careful. We should expect lawyers to investi-
gate beyond what their clients have told them and to research beyond the
law which occurs to them over lunch. This is a learned profession, after all.
We should expect lawyers to learn about their cases and about the law
throughout their lives. Those of you who are law students may soon be done
paying your tuition but you will never be done paying your dues.
Rule 11 does far more, however, than simply assure care on the part of
attorneys. It changes our roles and responsibilities, and those of the courts,
in profound and troubling ways. The impact is felt uniquely by public inter-
est lawyers. First, Rule 11 makes every judge in every court and in every
case, in effect, a bar disciplinary committee of one. This is new. It is differ-
ent. It radically changes the function of courts and the relation of counsel
to those courts. 2 It ups the ante in every lawsuit. It puts the lawyers on
trial.
Usually, we separate the deciders of lawsuits from the discipliners of
lawyers. By separating disciplinary proceedings from the practice of the dis-
cipline, we stretch out time, and we import objective, detached deci-
sionmakers. In the crucible of a lawsuit, tempers flare and time becomes
compressed. The judge who has judged the case and has been challenged,
perhaps confronted, by the attorneys, should not - precisely because of the
risks of pique and prejudice - also sit in judgment on those attorneys. We
leave that to others.
But Rule 11, by tracking the language of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, imports that vague and complex structure into every court pro-
ceeding.33 In an adversary proceeding, counsel must act independently of
the judge. Yet Rule 11 confuses these roles, so crucial to our system of
truth-seeking.34 Rule 11 is, at bottom, just one more step in the "domestica-
tion" of attorneys, a process which has serious implications for access to the
court by the poor, the powerless, and the disadvantaged.36
32. Nelken puts it this way: "The federal judge is now required not only to be an active
case manager, but also to police lawyers who overuse, misuse, or otherwise abuse the litigation
process." Nelken, supra note 2, at 1313.
33. The parallel between Rule II and the Code of Professional Responsibility is dis-
cussed in Comment, The Dynamics of Rule I1, supra note 2, at 316-17; Cavanagh, supra note
2, at 525-26.
34. The role confusion threatened by Rule II was rejected by the Ninth Circuit:
[N]either Rule II nor any other rule [requires] that [a] lawyer, in addition to advo-
cating the cause of his client, step first into the shoes of opposing counsel to find all
potentially contrary authority and finally into the robe of the judge to decide whether the
authority is indeed contrary or whether it is distinguishable.
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986).
35. See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1345-52. The Miami Law Review misses the point in
saying that critics of Rule 11 "desire to protect [a] sacred paradigm" of adversarial litigation
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A second troubling feature of Rule 11 is the abrupt shift from a sub-
jective standard to an objective standard in evaluating attorneys. The im-
portance of this bears repeating. Until 1983, Rule II sanctioned attorneys
only when it could be said in fact, subjectively, actually, that they intended
to abuse the process. 6 Failure to read a pleading, failure to conduct ade-
quate factual investigation, or failure to stay within tenable bounds of legal
theory might lead to dismissal of a case. But previously, they could not lead
to dismissal of a lawyer's career. Now, even absent bad faith, they can be a
basis for sanctions.
Indeed, the 1983 amendments seem to permit sanctions for objective
failures and for subjective failures, vaguely undefined as "any other im-
proper purpose."'37 Is indignation "improper"? Anger? Outrage? A hunger
for justice? Suppose a suit is otherwise valid - may, or should, a court
nevertheless inquire into motive? And if, as is always true, a client's mo-
tives are mixed, is the lawyer subject to sanctions? Should not such ques-
tions have been answered before Rule 11 was amended, and not left hang-
ing, leaving lawyers twisting slowly in the winds of political change?38
and "the sacred lair of the adversarial lion" by keeping a passive judge. Comment, Ask Ques-
tions, supra note 2, at 1288-89. Rather, the critics support the active judge but insist on active
counsel as well. That is the point of the adversary process, missed both by Rule II and the
Miami Law Review.
36. All authorities concur that subjective bad faith is no longer required by the amended
Rule 1I. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.
1985); Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 511-13; Nelken, supra note 2, at 1318-20.
37. Rule I I's requirements as to theory may, in fact, now be both objective and subjec-
tive. The Rule requires "belief formed after reasonable inquiry." The attorney also certifies the
absence of "improper motive." In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Consequently,
the 1983 amendments may justify sanctions where an attorney is either subjectively or objec-
tively at fault. See Judge Weinstein's critical and careful analysis in Eastway, 762 F.2d at
253. This hardly provides guidance for court or comfort for counsel. See Cavanagh, supra note
2, at 526-28. Nelken writes "it is more accurate to say that the rule adds an objective layer to
the subjective core of traditionally sanctionable bad faith conduct." Nelken, supra note 2, at
1320.
38. As to Rule I l's containing both a subjective and objective element, MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE states:
Although Rule II calls for the imposition of sanctions in the case of papers filed with
'any improper purpose,' the stricter and more straightforward standard of liability
adopted for filings not preceded by adequate factual and legal inquiry has caused most
cases to be decided without an examination of the filing's real 'purpose.' It has even been
suggested that filings that are solidly grounded in law and fact are not susceptible to Rule
I I sanctions, regardless of the subjective purpose behind their filing. In light of the Rule's
plain language to the effect that a signature constitutes a certification as to both an ade-
quate basis for the filing and the absence of an improper purpose, however, a filer's mali-
cious intent should still suffice to subject him to sanctions. Where it is clear that a filing
is motivated by a desire to harass or delay, the 'improper purpose' clause remains as an
independent means of imposing liability.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 3, § 11.02[4], at 11-24 to -25 (footnotes omitted).
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In the last three years, over two hundred reported cases have dealt
with sanctions against attorneys. There may be hundreds unreported. Yet
none answers these questions I have just posed. So each of you, when filing
a lawsuit in federal court, runs the risk of making new law, rather than
practicing it.89 The impact on independence of counsel is obvious. Vague-
ness in sanctions is the best way to chill rights, whether in a First Amend-
ment context or in the adversary process. The right to sue, to petition for
redress of grievances, is an important element of the First Amendment. It is
seriously compromised by Rule 11.
The fact is that lawsuits are often brought on scanty facts for the sim-
ple reason that the facts are in the hands of the adverse party.4 Also, novel
legal theories may be invoked to deal with newly emerging injuries or to
vindicate newly conceived interests. The genius of the common law and of
our Constitution has been the capacity to grow and change, and litigation
serves a vital role in this process.41 Yet Rule 11 creates both objective and
subjective tools which empower judges to curb attorneys and bring them to
heel. Rule 11 chills not only the exercise of rights and the exercise of advo-
cacy, but also the healthy process of growth in the law.42
A third consideration, profoundly troubling, about Rule 11 is that it
39. The Harvard Law Review discusses several cases, making the indisputable point that
courts cannot agree as to what is a tenable legal theory avoiding sanctions under Rule II and
observing that in a 1985 Federal Judicial Center survey of 292 judges, "half of the judges in
the survey would have sanctioned as frivolous the same paper that the other half of the re-
sponding judges thought did not violate the Rule." Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2, at
641.
40. The difficulties under Rule II with respect to facts are illustrated by the rather
thoughtless declaration in one Comment that "omitting material facts or pleading false ones is
a definitive violation of Rule Il 's requirement that factual theories be 'well grounded' and
therefore warrants sanctions." Comment, The Dynamics of Rule I/, supra note 2, at 320. An
attorney cannot know what is "material" until the other side submits a responsive pleading.
Similarly, an attorney cannot know what is "false" until after discovery or trial and, often-
times, not even then.
41. [V]iewed as part of expanded expectations of justice, increased litigation may not
look so undesirable. New ideas of justice reflected in the very categories of cases to which
Rule I I is most often applied have in recent years expanded the meaning of equality, the
scope of individual rights, and the strength of the welfare state. The degree to which the
legal system should remain open as a forum for debate about, and even adoption of, new
versions of justice is part of what is at stake in decisions about how broadly to use Rule
11.
Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2, at 632.
42. Rule 11 not only ignores the difficulty in determining when a claim is tenable but
also assumes there is no judicial interest in the growth of the law. By subordinating attorneys
to judges, the Rule confounds both process and roles. "Although it may be the role of judges to
keep the development of doctrine within workable bounds, litigators uniquely contribute to
doctrinal dynamism by creating pressure for change. Rule II should not be construed to de-
mand that lawyers behave like judges when pre-screening their clients' claims." Note, Plausi-
ble Pleadings, supra note 2, at 649-50.
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makes sanctions mandatory and does so regardless of who has prevailed in
the case, without any criteria for setting the amount of such sanctions.43
Indeed, even the purpose of sanctions - compensation, deterrence, or pun-
ishment44 - is not specified. And the measure, quite apart from the pur-
pose, is left wholly to discretion. If the measure is "reasonable" attorney's
fees caused by the misconduct,' 5 the element of causation in litigation is
hard indeed to trace. Not surprisingly, estimates as to what amount is "rea-
sonable" vary widely even between courts involved in the same case. Thus,
the trial court in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York 6 at first
imposed no sanctions, then imposed $1,000 on reversal and remand, and
then was reversed again by the Court of Appeals, which imposed sanctions
of $10,000. The defendant had sought over $50,000. 4 1
Rule 11 is troublesome enough when viewed within its own terms. But
the Rule's true impact emerges only when it is viewed in a broader context.
So viewed, the Rule collides with Congress' support of social legislation. It
also represents an attack on the liberal policies underlying the Federal
Rules reform of federal courts. It is a clear challenge to Congress' recent
encouragement of litigation through attorney's fees.
B. Setting the Rule in Context
Our nation's advances over the past decades in welfare, education,
housing, the environment, and civil rights consistently have come from Con-
gress. Law teachers and law students are prone to criticize the legislative
process as inept and political, and to view it as bending to expediency and
pandering to prejudice. But the reality is that Congress has consistently
legislated for social reform, individual rights, and the public interest.
Courts, in contrast, have consistently - and perhaps properly - responded
43. The sanctions under the 1983 amendments are mandatory, a most unusual feature.
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
200 (1985), suggests courts will nevertheless insist on inherent discretion. This seems unlikely.
See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
44. Significantly, Rule II not only broadens the definition of offending conduct but also
the range and frequency of sanctions. Nelken, supra note 2, at 1321-23. But it offers conflict-
ing purposes - punishment and compensation - with no guidance as to when to invoke or
apply them. Id. at 1323-25. It is clear that some believe that fees assessed under Rule 11 are
intended as sanctions and as punishment. See Schwarzer, supra note 43, at 201. In the view of
some, the punishment and deterrence functions of Rule II are predominant. See Comment,
The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 2, at 328-29. Fee-shifting is, however, asserted as an
equally important objective and sanction. Id. at 331.
45. Generally, the sanction is limited to "reasonable" attorney's fees, but come courts
have gone beyond these. Nelken, supra note 2, at 1333 n.130.
46. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modi-
fied, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
47. Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 577. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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to these initiatives in the most conservative of ways. Often this is simply a
product of the responsibility for interpreting the Constitution.
But Rule 11 is not so based. It is a legislative, regulatory creation of
the Supreme Court. It tends toward closing access to the courts, and di-
rectly collides with Congress' will as expressed over the past fifty years.4
Congress approved in detail the policy and procedures underlying the
adoption of the Federal Rules nearly fifty years ago. The basic thrust is to
open courts, not close them.49 Among other innovations, the new rules led
to "notice" pleading, expanded discovery, and such innovations as summary
judgment and the pretrial conference.50 Rule 11 now returns us to a dishon-
ored era of fact pleading.51 The Supreme Court, by its 1983 amendments,
has thus begun a rollback of fundamental congressional policy.
The courts have masked this rejection of congressional policy of open
courts by claiming that there is a need to curb frivolous litigation52 and
reduce delay in the courts. Yet the Advisory Committee in 1983 did not
48. There is a real question as to the legitimacy of those amendments. The 1983 amend-
ments were adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). At the
threshold, one may ask whether that Act permits imposing sanctions and then, next, requiring
sanctions. See Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some Questions About Power, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983); Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). Beyond this, that Act can
hardly authorize rules conflicting with other legislation, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. No commentary on Rule II has thus far considered this point of infirmity. See Com-
ment, Ask Questions, supra note 2, at 1293-94.
49. By freighting and formalizing the beginning of the process, Rule II runs counter to
the special genius of the Federal Rules and counter to "the realist jurisprudential roots of the
Federal Rules system. Reading the Rule too broadly promotes efficiency only at the cost of
deterring undeveloped and nonstandard claims. The realist reformers who wrote the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure aimed to accommodate precisely those claims." Note, Plausible
Pleadings, supra note 2, at 632.
50. Rule Il's insistence on extensive pre-filing fact inquiry runs precisely against the
basic policy of the Federal Rules to abandon fact pleading in favor of notice pleading and to
expand pre-trial, formal discovery. See Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 514 n.108.
51. Although the "well grounded-in-fact" requirement does not explicitly modify the
standards governing notice pleading under Rule 8, the effect is to require articulating facts and
theory with much greater particularity. The result is to repeal 50 years of reform under the
Federal Rules. Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2, at 635-36. There is a similar impact
on the other great innovation of the Federal Rules, pre-trial discovery, since now a complaint
must be "well grounded in fact." This moves discovery from pre-trial to pre-filing, eliminating
or sanctioning cases "for factually undeveloped pleadings regardless of the potential for finding
additional factual support through discovery." Id. at 636, 644-51.
52. A concern for frivolous and abusive litigation or tactics, it is said, prompted the 1983
amendments to Rule 11. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
But the advisory committee notes do not document the causes or contours of this problem or
explain how the amendments will solve it. This author's common sense hunch is that the prob-
lem has grown no faster than the volume of litigation itself. At least, no one has shown other-
wise. But see Schwarzer, supra note 43, at 181-82.
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provide statistics substantiating this "problem."53 Nor is there any reason to
believe Rule 11 will "solve" the problem,54 although it will clearly create
the problems discussed earlier, and will generate new litigation, com-
pounding these problems.
If there is indeed a problem, the Federal Rules have long given judges
broad managerial authority to regulate class actions and discovery and to
dispose of cases by summary judgment.58 Moreover, in 1983 that authority
was considerably broadened.56 So the amendments to Rule 11 were doubly
unnecessary.57 The simple fact is that Rule 11 now represents a direct chal-
lenge to congressional policy, of nearly fifty years' duration, that the courts
should be open, not closed, to the public.
This challenge is also on a collision course with congressional support
for public interest litigation. Congress has fought over the last decade to
keep the Legal Services Corporation alive and to keep it serving the poor. It
has created legal entitlements and rested enforcement upon what is now the
slimming reed of public interest litigation. Significantly, when Congress de-
cided in 1980 to make sanctions possible against attorneys, it chose 28
U.S.C. § 1927, not Rule 11, amending the former so that attorney's fees
would be awarded only where the offending attorney had multiplied pro-
53. There simply is no evidence that frivolous claims or vexatious litigation have created
"the problem" prompting Rule I I and its sanctions. No empirical study has been undertaken
to show cause, consequence, or cure. Professor Miller opines that we may simply be victims of
that peculiar form of truth-telling known as the "cosmic anecdote." Comment, Ask Questions,
supra note 2, at 1289 n.142. Such anecdotes in the past had us living on a flat world, with the
sun revolving around us.
54. Courts and commentators agree that Rule 11, as amended, is intended not only to
reduce misconduct but also costs and delay. See sources cited supra at note 3. See also
Schwarzer, supra note 43, at 182-83; Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 66 JUDICA-
TURE 363 (1983). But most increases in costs and delay are a product of the increase in vol-
ume and complexity of litigation, an inevitable product of our times. The emerging caselaw
under Rule II suggests that litigating about Rule II will consume far more resources, time,
and money then the litigation deterred by it. Consider, for example, the Eastway and Golden
Eagle cases discussed in the text. Consider, also, that much - or at least some - of the
litigation about Rule II is itself frivolous or intended to harass litigants.
55. Case management is better achieved by "pretrial conferences, discovery conferences,
limitations on discovery requests, allocation of discovery expenses, and dismissal. Reliance on
these procedures where feasible is more compatible with the realist emphasis on increasing
rather than restricting the flow of information relevant to legal disputes." Note, Plausible
Pleadings, supra note 2, at 649.
56. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
57. It may be granted that there have been abuses in litigation maintenance, particu-
larly in discovery. But amending Rule II was not necessary to address those. At the time of
that amendment, Rule 7, 16, and 26 were also amended, giving federal judges vastly increased
authority over discovery and pre-trial conferences. See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1313-17.
These alone should have sufficed. At least it would have been wise to try them in isolation,
particularly since vigorous judicial case management is a relatively new phenomenon. See Res-
nik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 376, 376-77 (1982).
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ceedings unreasonably or engaged in vexatious conduct. 58 Rule 11 goes well
beyond this and thus runs counter to congressional choices and policy.5"
The conflict is particularly acute in the arena of attorney's fees stat-
utes. Congress had created literally dozens of statutes which award attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in public interest litigation cases.60 Notwith-
standing these statutes, Congress has deliberately and carefully not
repealed the American Rule, leaving each party to bear its own costs.6"
This array, or balance, is designed to assure optimum use of the courts in
the public interest.62 The Supreme Court, by amending Rule 11, has upset
this. It has provided that in "American Rule" cases, where Congress has
chosen not to award fees, they may nevertheless be awarded as sanctions,
contrary to congressional policy. In cases where Congress has authorized
attorney's fees for prevailing parties, Rule 11 may offset these by sanctions
awarded to losing parties. Moreover, Rule 11 mandates fees for defendants
by an objective standard, although attorney's fees statutes, such as the 1976
Act, award fees to defendants only in extraordinary cases for outrageous
misconduct.63
58. Prior to Rule I1's 1983 amendments, courts could invoke either their inherent equity
powers or their statutory powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) to impose sanctions for willful
abuse or bad faith by attorneys. Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 507-10. But the standard, as with
Rule 11 prior to 1983, required actual, subjective bad faith. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d
1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986). See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1316-17.
59. Consistently with the American Rule, ample provision exists in a federal court's in-
herent powers to deal with bad faith or vexatious litigation. See Aleyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Comment, The Dynamics of Rule I/, supra note 2, at
309. Statutory authority also exists in 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
60. The "American Rule" requires each party to bear its own fees and expenses.
Aleyeska, 421 U.S. at 240. As the Supreme Court noted in Aleyeska, there are multiple ex-
ceptions, created by Congress. A few of these exceptions were designed to shift costs against
parties, to deter misconduct. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). The vast majority, literally
dozens of statutes, were designed to enforce public policy by encouraging litigation through
awarding fees to prevailing parties. The most important of these, the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)), was passed after Aleyeska, in which the Supreme Court adhered to the American
Rule. See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (App. to Opinion of Brennan, J.).
61. Congressional policy, broadly stated, is reflected in the "American Rule" governing
attorney's fees. Essentially, each party bears its own costs. The result is a democratic ideal.
"Unfettered access to the courts for all citizens with genuine legal disputes has become a
cornerstone of the American concept of justice. All persons are entitled to their day in court,
however poor they may be and however rich their opponents." Comment, The Dynamics of
Rule I/, supra note 2, at 304. Rule II runs counter to this.
62. It has been said that the American Rule encourages frivolous litigation, Comment,
The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 2, at 306-07, and that Rule 11 is therefore a necessary
counterpoint. The reasoning, if that is what it is, is hard to fathom. The American Rule means
that much litigation is, in fact, never brought, because there are no fees even for a prevailing
attorney. The assertion that, in such a setting, litigation will be brought "simply to gain access
to discovery," is simply unsubstantiated. Id. at 306.
63. The experience and policy under fee-shifting statutes have been to award fees rou-
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The impact on public interest attorneys is serious, indeed. The risks are
substantial; the outcomes unclear. The attorneys' deference to the judge
must now be greater; their commitment to the client must be diminished.
64
Their utility as advocates of social policy is compromised.
C. And Now, A Few Examples
It is worthwhile looking at a few cases to see in microcosm the impact
of Rule 11. It bears emphasis that these are only a few of several hundred
cases. Moreover, they involve some of the most sophisticated and able mem-
bers of the bar. If trial judges are sanctioning these attorneys, the portent is
ominous indeed for the rest of us. As the old saw goes, only the angels can
afford justice, the rest of us cry for mercy.
In Golden Eagle Distribution Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,65 a trial judge
sanctioned Kirkland and Ellis under Rule 11. This major Chicago law firm
had successfully pursued its client's interests with vigor and imagination.
Nevertheless, a $5,000 fine was imposed on the attorneys for two reasons.
First, they had failed to state whether they were invoking existing law or
arguing for its extension. Secondly, the judge held that Kirkland and Ellis
had not cited authority contrary to their position, as required by the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
In effect, the court found unprofessional and perhaps incompetent con-
duct. Such a finding is devastating, whether against a sole practitioner or a
major national law firm. Kirkland and Ellis appealed. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court found that the trial judge
had exceeded the bounds of Rule 11 by converting it into a Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The implications of such a conversion are endless.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the trial judge had put the law firm
to the impossible task of having to play the roles of judge, plaintiff's coun-
sel, and defense counsel, an impossible task, indeed. The court noted that
tinely to prevailing plaintiffs, but to award them to defendants rarely. Christianburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-20 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402-03 (1968). This implements congressional policy to encourage civil rights litiga-
tion. It avoids chilling enforcement of the public interest. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 fly
in the face of this congressional policy. See Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 509-11.
64. Rule II inquiries, because they arise in the same context as the litigation prompting
them, inevitably create attorney-client conflicts. Nelken, supra note 2, at 1343-44. This is in-
herent in fee-shifting statutes. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1987). But because Rule II
operates independently of whether a party prevails on the merits, it strikes uniquely at the
attorney's performance and therefore his or her relationship with the client. This is exacer-
bated by the judge's discretion to force the attorney to pay sanctions from the attorney's re-
sources. See Huettig & Schromm v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Comment, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 2, at 331 n.228.
65. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the Rule 11 proceeding has engendered extensive and expensive litigation,
contrary to the very objectives of the Rule.
If a major law firm is at risk, imagine then the plight and vulnerability
of public interest lawyers, who typically are of far less stature and are en-
dowed with far fewer resources. In Kamen v. AT&T,66 an attorney ad-
vanced a claim on behalf of a client who maintained that she had been
discharged because of an allergy to cigarette smoke. She had requested a
transfer. In essence, the suit maintained that American Telephone & Tele-
graph had discharged her rather than accommodate her needs. The suit was
brought under a statute which prohibited discrimination in federally funded
programs.
Kamen is typical of much public interest litigation. It invoked a rela-
tively new statute of unclear meaning. It advanced the public interest of
assuring fair treatment and employment of the handicapped. It involved a
disparity of power of enormous proportions, a single individual against one
of the most powerful corporations in the world. And, at a ground level of
litigation, it pitched a small firm against sophisticated and well-entrenched
counsel, in a case where the defendants alone knew the true facts of the
corporate motivation and policy.
The trial judge granted summary judgment against the plaintiff and
imposed Rule 11 sanctions. Essentially, the court said that the plaintiff's
attorney should not have relied upon his client's description of what had
happened. The plaintiffs attorney responded that he could hardly rely on
AT&T's counsel's representations that section 504 did not apply to AT&T.
Rather, only discovery could determine whether the necessary federal fund-
ing was involved for section 504 to apply and whether in fact discrimination
had taken place. For discovery to be possible, a lawsuit was necessary.
The Third Circuit reversed the sanctions. Counsel had reasonably re-
lied on his client's representations. He undertook the factual verification
that was available. His legal theory, while innovative, was appropriate. He
was vindicated on appeal.6" But the stigma, the anxiety, and the cost of
fighting the sanctions had all been imposed and exacted. The trial court and
the opposing counsel had extracted their pound of flesh.
66. 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
67. The Advisory Committee to Rule II noted that factual inquiry, although required to
meet the objective standard of the 1983 amendments, must be evaluated in light of the time
available, the need to rely on the client, reliance on referring counsel, and other factors; it
should not be evaluated with a court's subjective hindsight. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory com-
mittee's note to 1983 amendment. Yet, the purpose was to expand the range and frequency of
sanctions. Therefore, the reality is to disadvantage plaintiff's attorneys when facing powerful
governmental or corporate opposition, as was the case in Kamen and is the case in much public
interest litigation.
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Golden Eagle and Kamen represent the approaches of appellate courts
which are relatively sympathetic to public interest litigation. We should
pause now to consider a case from a circuit which is far less enlightened. In
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,6 8 the Seventh Circuit reversed a
lower court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions. Szabo had served food at the
Cook County Jail for some eight years. It lost the contract in 1986 and
sued, claiming racial discrimination, denial of due process, and various vio-
lations of state law. Szabo asked for an expedited hearing on its motion for
preliminary hearing, but then withdrew its case and filed in state court,
where it ultimately lost. The defendants asked for Rule 11 sanctions, which
were denied. The trial court gave no reasons other than being "well aware
of the case."69
The Seventh Circuit reversed. It noted that the defendants were not
"prevailing parties" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act and
also were barred from getting costs under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), since voluntary
dismissals are - after all - much to be encouraged. But, Judges Easter-
brook and Posner wrote, Rule 11 sanctions are more like a contempt charge
than a disposition on the merits. If Szabo "imposed costs on its adversary
and the judicial system by violating Rule 11, it must expect to pay."1' That
has a comforting Old Testament ring to it, but dissenting Judge Cudahy
more aptly analogized it to grading law school examinations, with the con-
sequence that "[alnything falling on the far side of the 'C' merits not only
loss of one's case but loss of one's shirt as well."' '
The Szabo majority reversed denial of sanctions even though the de-
fendants, when originally moving for sanctions in the trial court, had vio-
lated rules below on pleading and filing such motions! This rush to judg-
ment could be explained only by the majority's distaste for the due process
and equal protection claims filed by Szabo. The majority dismissed the
complaint's due process theory in an ultra-conservative critique of the plain-
tiff's citing of cases. 72 This part of the Szabo opinion should embarrass the
court and counsel alike. The fact is that the plaintiff cited the wrong cases
for the right theory.
The court's hostility to public interest litigation is even more clear in
the majority's discussion of Szabo's racial claim that Szabo qualified for
68. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987). For a balanced appraisal of the Seventh Circuit's
performance in this area, see also Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United
States, 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing $30,000 in sanctions against a law professor
for bringing claims on behalf of a medical school graduate who failed licensing exams; case
remanded for findings on why, although the claims lacked merit, sanctions were necessary).
69. Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1076.
70. Id. at 1079.
71. Id. at 1085.
72. Id. at 1080-82.
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minority set-asides under county ordinances and that the defendant did not.
Judges Easterbrook and Posner concluded that such set-asides are unconsti-
tutional, a conservative view not universally shared. 3 Moreover, it hardly
seems appropriate for two judges to have reached out and decided constitu-
tional merits not before them; the case had been voluntarily dismissed
before any responsive pleading.
Judges Easterbrook and Posner also critiqued the factual underpinning
of the plaintiff's claim. As with most public interest litigation, the facts
were in the hands of the defendant governmental agency. Ignoring this fact,
the majority mouthed plausible platitudes such as, "[d]iscovery fills in the
details, but you must have the outline of a claim at the beginning. Rule 11
requires 'independent inquiry.' "7 Yet there was no basis before the Court
of Appeals or the trial court to suggest that the plaintiffs had not made
independent inquiry. Instead, the two-judge majority simply stated that the
reasons for bringing suit may be improper, for example to harass defend-
ants, and that inquiry, therefore, was necessary. Yet this will be true in
every case, and it forces plaintiffs in every case to prove that they are pure
of heart, a condition which can be true, if ever (one must infer), only of
Judges Easterbrook and Posner.
The majority in Szabo emphasized the subjective test of inquiring into
the motive for bringing the suit, and thereby created a pre-trial focus unlike
that under former Rule 11. Presumably courts must now inquire into, and
presumably sanction, the mixed motives which every litigant has, because,
and this is important, as Szabo says, "[t]he Rule effectively picks up the
torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
7 5
Thus Rule 11 will now serve as a source of tort jurisprudence. Dissent-
ing Judge Cudahy found this prospect daunting because it would transform
"Rule 11 from a protection against frivolous litigation, a boon to the parties
and the court, into a fomenter of derivative litigation, a mire for unwary
parties and overzealous courts. '76 Later, Judge Cudahy noted that "[w]e
are in danger of creating a whole new cottage industry of sanctions. 77
Judge Cudahy shares my concern that the impact of this will be felt dis-
ciminatorily by public interest litigants, especially those asserting due pro-
cess or civil rights claims, "[flor the chilling effect of today's decision will
reach as tellingly to the most meritorious such claim as to the least. ' 78
73. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding minority set-aside in
congressional legislation).
74. Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1083.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1085 (Cudahay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 1086.
78. Id.
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The problems and perplexities posed by Rule 11 are particularly well
illuminated by the rather extraordinary legal saga of Eastway Construction
Corporation, which failed in its bids on redevelopment projects in New
York City. After failing in its lawsuits in New York's courts, Eastway then
brought an antitrust and civil rights action in federal court. These claims
were painted with a rather broad brush, since Eastway had essentially been
shut out of contracts because of defaulting on millions of dollars of earlier
contracts and engaging, through its president, in fraudulent maneuverings
in the 1970s. Not only did the Court of Appeals have no troubling affirming
summary judgment against Eastway, but it also reversed denial of attor-
ney's fees for the defendants.7 9 The court held that Eastway's claims were
so groundless that, under an objective standard, sanctions were necessary
under Rule 11.
It may well be that the Second Circuit read Rule 11 correctly in re-
versing and remanding. The plot, as they say, however now thickens. On
remand, a year or so later, Chief Judge Jack Weinstein authored a twenty-
three page opinion, complete with a Table of Contents. In effect, he gave
short shrift to the Court of Appeals' opinion. The lower court was going to
award only $1,000 in fees because Eastway had proceeded in good faith and
its "pleading was only marginally frivolous." 80 The City of New York had
asked for $53,000.
Judge Weinstein noted,81 correctly in my view, that courts should insist
on discretion in imposing sanctions and should keep them to the minimum
necessary to deter frivolity. Moreover, contrary to the Court of Appeals, he
insisted that subjective good faith remains relevant under amended Rule
11. Unlike fee-shifting statutes designed to compensate plaintiffs for enforc-
ing the public interest, awards to defendants - whether under Rule 11 or
statutes - should be premised on a deterrence rationale. Hence, amounts
awarded should be far less, largely on a cost-based analysis, and should be
reduced further by other factors, such as ability to pay.82
By now, Eastway had been ensnared in this satellite litigation for
years, but it was not yet done. For there was yet another chapter on the
Rule 11 issues, written by Judge Newman in a second opinion by the Sec-
ond Circuit, known as Eastway 1.83 Again, the lower court was reversed.
The sanctions awarded against Eastway were increased to $10,000. It is
hard to tell why. The Court of Appeals agreed that there was discretion,
79. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
80. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 582-84 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
81. Id. at 565-66.
82. Id. at 570-72.
83. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
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that the "lodestar" amount need not routinely be imposed, and that Judge
Weinstein had "thoughtfully considered a variety of factors."8 And then,
turning the table on Judge Weinstein, the Court of Appeals gave short
shrift to his lengthy opinion by increasing his award tenfold without giving
a single reason. Moreover, it reversed his finding that counsel had been free
of fault and ordered that counsel pay half of the $10,000 in sanctions." The
court then declared that, although there was a remand, there would be -
could be - no further fees. In essence, it told Judge Weinstein to put up,
and then shut up.
Eastway is an extraordinary case. Simply litigating the Rule 11 issue
prolonged the case by at least two - possibly four - years. It provoked
three lengthy and not very helpful, opinions. It failed to provide or even
suggest guidelines for important questions such as when sanctions are ap-
propriate, how much those sanctions should be, and against whom they
should be imposed. It left the trial and appellate courts in disagreement by
a factor of ten ($10,000 versus $1,000) in an area where the Court of Ap-
peals noted that most awards were even less than the trial court's. Finally,
it totally abandoned any pretense that the Court of Appeals would be con-
strained or restrained by the usual principles of appellate deference to trial
court discretion.
The portent for public interest litigation is not, to say the least,
auspicious.
IV. WHITHER PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION?
A. The Impact on Public Interest Litigation
Perhaps I have now persuaded you that there is a problem. However,
the dimensions remain to be developed. Perhaps Szabo and Eastway are
rare exceptions; perhaps the calm reason of Kamen and Golden Eagle
prevails. That is not true, but even if it were, it would only mean that ap-
pellate courts were insisting on reasons.86 Some have suggested that the
trial courts are also being appropriately cautious and measured in imposing
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id. at 124.
86. As to the standard of appellate review, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE states:
In reviewing Rule I I cases on appeal, several different standards are applied. As to the
legal issue of whether a violation occurred and sanctions were required, the appeals court
reviews the trial court's determination de novo. To the extent that any factual issues are
involved, the trial court's findings must stand unless clearly erroneous. In terms of the
specific sanction imposed upon the finding of a violation, the trial court is accorded a
wide degree of discretion which will not be disturbed unless that discretion has been
abused.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 3 § 11.02[4], at 11-27 (footnotes omitted).
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sanctions.87 Others, including the Advisory Committee, claim that the 1983
amendments should not discourage creative risk-taking in litigation.88 But
the early returns are coming in, and the reality confounds the rhetoric.
Although civil rights cases constitute less then 8% of case filing in fed-
eral court, they amounted to more than 22% of reported Rule 11 cases
between 1983 and 1985.89 Unreported cases would increase those numbers,
as would certain public interest litigation (i.e., welfare or housing rights)
that is not classified as "civil rights." If the categories are broadened to
include civil rights, employment discrimination, and other relevant catego-
ries, these categories account for 29.9% of Rule 11 motions, with sanctions
being granted 68% of the time. Another 25.1% of the reported Rule 11
cases involved antitrust, RICO, and securities claims. 90 Such cases have in
common congressionally enacted authority, often accompanied by attorney's
fees statutes. They are also uniquely targeted by Rule 11 because their
facts cannot be adequately developed until after suit,9' and because their
theories are often on the forefront of developing law."
It is not only certain classes of cases which are being discriminated
against but also certain classes of attorneys. Those whose clients do not
have the resources or access of great corporations or governmental agencies
are uniquely disadvantaged. Such attorneys are likely to be small firm prac-
titioners or are likely to be employed by public interest groups or legal ser-
vices programs.93 Thus, Rule 11 targets both public interest litigation and
public interest litigators. Significantly, a number of critics of Rule 11 have
noted that Brown v. Board of Education94 would be particularly vulnerable
today,9 5 since it was public interest litigation brought by a public interest
87. A study of judges' attitudes in 1984 by the Federal Judicial Center suggested, in
response to questionnaires, that they might impose sanctions reluctantly and might continue to
require bad faith. S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE I I SANCTIONS (Fed. Jud. Center
1985). Experience since then demonstrates that the study was too soon and too optimistic. But
see Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 515-16.
88. The Reporter for the Advisory Committee, Professor Arthur Miller, has consistently
urged that the 1983 amendments are value-neutral and not intended to dampen adversarial
enthusiasm. See Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24.
89. See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1327.
90. See Comment, The Dynamics of Rule I1, supra note 2, at 323.
91. Cavanagh notes that the "nebulous" nature of the pre-filing inquiry requirement is
especially bothersome in gender-based discrimination cases, which must typically be proven
from a defendant's files after suit has been initiated. Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 517-18.
92. The increasing inhospitality over the past few years toward civil rights claims makes
the chilling effect, prospectively and pervasively projected, especially troublesome. Nelken,
supra note 2, at 1340-41. This is particularly true since discovery is frequently necessary in
such cases even to frame a complaint with great specificity and articulate a theory with preci-
sion. Id. at 1342-43.
93. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2, at 643.
94. 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987).
95. In Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
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law firm.
Like many such litigators, the lead attorneys were members of a racial
minority.
B. Roll Back Rule 11
The experience with Rule 11 is now less than five years old, but the
dangers which many saw from the outset are now being realized. It does
not seem too early simply to repeal the 1983 Amendment. Congress could
undertake such a step if the courts choose not to, and doing so would ad-
vance important congressional policies.
This would mean that regulation of attorneys would be left, as it prop-
erly has been, to the court admissions procedures of licensing and testing,
and to the bar complaint procedures and regulations. Over the past decade,
these latter procedures have expanded dramatically, with public panels be-
ing appointed, full-time attorneys and commissioners being retained, and
the volumes of complaints and sanctions against attorneys expanding dra-
matically. This approach seems to me clearly proper: it separates the ad-
ministrative functions concerning the bar from the adjudicatory functions of
resolving specific cases.
If the 1983 Amendments are retained, they should be sharply cur-
tailed. Deficiencies in inquiry in facts9" or legal theory97 should be made
circumstances evidencing bad faith rather than actionable failings in and of
themselves.9 8 The requirement of subjective bad faith should be restored.
Judge Jack Weinstein, referring to Brown and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), ob-
served that "[b]ad court decisions must be challenged if they are to be overruled, but the early
challenges are certainly hopeless." Yet, he concluded, they should still be brought. Id. at 575.
See also Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 544.
96. By imposing a pre-filing requirement of factual inquiry, Rule II implies that certain
facts should deter filing, but it does not say which facts or what quantity of facts. Facts may
develop a waivable defense, or information from an adversary which runs counter to a claim,
or defects in the client's own documentation or evidence, or theoretical elements falling into
work product, or other privilege. Cavanagh, supra note 2, at 517-24. But the Rule and subse-
quent caselaw do not distinguish such possibilities or provide guidelines for dealing with them.
Id.
97. Sanctions for frivolous theory are especially worrisome, since "today's frivolity may
be tomorrow's law." Risinger, supra note 7, at 57. Sanctions for defective research or briefing
are hardly more tolerable, since seemingly "mechanical" deficiencies may reflect stratagems in
advocacy. The clearest and best approach would be to stay with dismissals under Rule
12(b)(6) and award attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
98. Cavanagh proposes a "bright line" framework to resolve problems under Rule 11,
but he nowhere notes the special problems of public interest litigants. Cavanagh, supra note 2,
at 536. While he would grant latitude for counsel to proceed when Rule 22 suggests otherwise,
for example, solely on a client's representations, his footnotes and the caselaw provide little
support.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1988], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss2/3
FEDERAL RULE 11
Thus Rule 11 would have exclusively subjective elements, much as is true
under fee-shifting statutes that make awards in public interest litigation. 9
The Szabo approach should clearly be rejected. A subjective standard
should not become a vehicle for importing tort law into the Federal Rules.
Abuse of process and kindred torts are subjects for separate litigation. One
might point out to Judges Posner and Easterbrook, both self-proclaimed
conservatives, that tort litigation is better left to state courts in our federal
scheme of things.
Most importantly, Rule 11 sanctions should be altered in three re-
spects.' O First, criteria should be established as to the amount of sanctions.
Eastway points up the imprecision and inequity in simple speculation by a
court that an attorney somehow "caused" $30,000 in work by the other
side, and then having the court impose only $10,000 in sanctions because of
the attorney's ability to pay. Is the purpose to deter, punish, or compensate
for injuries caused and costs incurred?
"Causation" is particularly slippery if it turns on the opponent's per-
ception of an appropriate response. Under similar facts, counsel's response
may vary from bemused indifference to crusading outrage, with an equal
variance in time and resources allocated to the response. Then, too, as-
signing a dollar value per hour for the additional labor "caused" turns on
the luck of the draw. Sanctions are thus made to turn on the thinness of the
skin and the thickness of the wallets of opposing counsel. The public policy
behind Rule 11 is to upgrade performance of counsel, and the incentives for
doing so should not be limited by the dollar values of failing to do so.
I would further suggest, therefore, that the decision whether to impose
sanctions should be discretionary. Mandatory sanctions simply are unen-
forceable. Also, other deterrents exist. Rule 11 should be set in its proper
context and judges left with discretion to decline sanctions. This would
place a premium, however, on improving the procedure surrounding imposi-
tion of sanctions, at a minimum requiring a hearing with detailed find-
ings."' Improved procedure is essential even if sanctions remain mandatory
99. The Harvard Law Review, while roundly criticizing Rule 1I, mildly concludes that
it should be interpreted so that sanctions would be imposed only when a pleading is so frivo-
lous that it would be dismissed and no reasonable lawyer would think it tenable. Yet the
Review concludes that the genius of the Rules has been to expand the "unthinkable" over the
years. The Review fails to see that any interpretation of Rule I1, even its own, will put an end
to that expansion. Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 2, at 650-52.
100. Nelken suggests that improvements in Rule II should include making sanctions
non-mandatory, reading Rule II in light of Rule 8 to make sanctions unlikely at the pleadings
stage and "circumscribing" the punishment rationale for sanctions. Nelken, supra note 2, at
1353. This is a curiously insubstantial set of recommendations given her far-reaching criti-
cisms of the Rule, particularly as it applies to civil rights litigation.
101. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d
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and articulated criteria are necessary in either event.
My final suggestion would be that sanctions be denied to a plaintiff
who prevails on the merits and is awarded attorney's fees as a prevailing
party. Rule 11 sanctions would be gilding the lily, rubbing salt in the
wound, or some other such cliche. The attorney's fees award will adequately
compensate for the additional work caused by the wrongdoing. Conversely,
I would deny Rule 11 sanctions where a plaintiff loses, but the defendant
does not qualify as a "prevailing party." Congress has declared that attor-
ney's fees for a defendant may be available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 only
where the plaintiff acted in a frivolous, wholly baseless or vexatious fashion.
That being true, Rule 11 should create no alternative or additional
entitlement.1
0 2
C. What to do in the Meantime
I view all of this with urgency, and so should you. I spend a good deal
of my time encouraging young legal services attorneys about how to prac-
tice in federal court. The reason is that, in my experience, federal courts are
the best forum for representing the poor and the powerless. But doing so is
a new idea, and those who undertake such litigation now run the risks of
Rule 11 as they break new ground and explore new frontiers.
If I had faced such a risk, I truly wonder whether I could have af-
forded to bring my first section 1983 action some 20 years ago. Our weekly
food budget was $20; our savings account balance was $200. I could hardly
have afforded the expensive attorneys on the other side. Indeed, the lawsuit
itself was about the inability of client or counsel to pay filing fees in di-
vorces brought on behalf of indigents.
I also wonder whether, some 15 years ago, I would have advised one of
my teaching colleagues to challenge discriminatory denial of a zoning vari-
ance for his federally-subsidized housing proposal. I must ask similar ques-
tions concerning the recent filing of an amicus brief by my students and me
on behalf of the ACLU, in which we invoked international human rights on
behalf of a convicted sex offender who had been ordered by a trial judge to
put signs on his car and his home warning people away. What does Rule 11
say about international conventions on human rights?
Let me offer some suggestions.
1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987).
102. Otherwise, prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants would always get attor-
ney's fees, either under Rule II or a statute like 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This would preclude the
opportunity, experienced painfully by every attorney, of simply losing. It would result in auto-
matic awards in every case, something even Rule II does not contemplate. See Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Your factual investigation now should be far better documented than
was necessary before the amendments to Rule 11. Prior to filing, protective
letters should be sent to the opposing side, presenting detailed interrogato-
ries and allowing time to respond to factual inquiries.0'0 You must now take
seriously the remote possibility that arbitrary, indeed prejudiced, opponents
will provide you information which they may later suppress or destroy. You
should be careful to request meetings and conferences prior to litigation.
You should offer settlement in good faith. In short, you should undertake
efforts which your common sense will often tell you are utterly meaningless,
but which will offer some protection against Rule 11.
Similarly, you must be more careful in developing your legal theories.
Rule 11 expressly permits the expression of a theory based upon existing
law, an extension of law, or a good faith challenge to existing law. Be clear
in your pleadings and papers as to which of these you are undertaking. File
a memorandum of law with each pleading. And at all times, carefully check
the law of your circuit before suit.
Prior to bringing suit, one safe step might be to obtain opinion letters
from experienced attorneys in the particular field of law, to the effect that
respected experts endorse the theory you are advancing. Obtain a second
opinion before suing. Talk to your neighborhood law professor - we love to
see former students.10 4 Yet another suggestion would be to request a state-
ment of the law supporting denial of your client's rights from the potential
defendant or counsel. Admissions as to facts may also be helpful. To some
extent, admissions may be sought by pleading facts or attaching affidavits
to complaints and motions for summary judgment.
Plead early. Plead Often. Plead well.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 represents only another conservative effort to roll back the
20th century. It is a typically myopic elevation of "professionalism" as an
ultimate good without regard to why we are professionals or who should be
served by the profession. It reflects the same guild mentality which led the
Luddites to destroy knitting machines and the AMA to oppose Medicare.
In a curious way, the rule is good. The people who would close the
court doors to the poor, the disadvantaged, the minorities, and the power-
less of our age, and who would deny lawyers to such people, have now taken
103. The creation of a "paper trail" has been suggested by others as indispensable under
Rule I1. See Nelken, supra note 2, at 1344. Part of this will involve fruitless and pointless pre-
trial inquiries for information and settlement, much like the excesses of "defensive" medicine.
104. Unless, of course, you are going to get us into the same hot water which threatened
to cook Professor Brown's Visa card. See Brown v. Federation, 830 F.2d at 1431-33!!
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a public stand, and Rule 11 is their platform. If this is their best shot, or
their worst, there is little to fear. They will not succeed. Congress will act,
and even if not, you will.
Each of you knows that the law is an instrument for good and that
each of you is an advocate toward that end. No matter what three years of
law school may have done to you, and no matter what fifty years of practice
may yet do, you can recall that the reason you went to law school was to
help others. Oliver Wendell Holmes said that it is necessary for all of us to
involve ourselves in the great issues of our times in order to avoid being
counted as not having lived at all.106
Let me also recall for you the words of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. This
great Russian intellectual, writer, and dissident spent years in Siberia im-
prisoned in the Russian Gulag Archipelago, which became the name of one
of his best-known volumes. Imprisoned there, under the Russian legal sys-
tem, he had rights but no remedies. He had a voice, but no advocate. He
needed a lawyer. He Wrote: "[i]t seems a virtual fairy tale that somewhere,
at the ends of the earth, an accused person can avail himself of a lawyer's
help. This means having beside you in the most difficult moment of your life
a clear-minded ally who knows the law."' "
105. 0. HOLMES, Memorial Day, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 9, 10
(M. Lerner ed. 1943).
106. A. SOLZHENITSYN, Gulag Archipelago 121 (1973).
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